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FRINGE ECONOMY LENDING AND OTHER ABERRANT 
CONTRACTS: INTRODUCTION
SARAH HOWARD JENKINS*
Aberrant Contracts, rent to own agreements, third party legal lending 
contracts, payday loans, and title loan—often referred to as “fringe bank-
ing” in the fringe economy, are contractual relationships that lack the char-
acteristics of arms length, bargained for exchanges that dominate the focus 
of general contract law as taught in most U.S. law schools. These atypical 
agreements are, more often than not, used by individuals who lack the fi-
nancial ability to otherwise acquire the goods or services obtained. The 
loans themselves are generally “involves small dollar amount loans made 
for short periods of time.”1 Because these loans involve exorbitant fees and 
interest rates, some view the businesses that provide these loans or services 
as loan sharks, preying on the working poor by offering modern household 
necessities—refrigerators, washers and dryers, services, or cash flow that 
consumers need but are unable to acquire with credit cards, bank overdraft 
protection, or traditional loans. On the other hand, advocates for these 
businesses assert that the consumer adds value to their lives with the goods 
or services provided that cannot be otherwise afforded;2 the rates charged 
reflect the risks undertaken in servicing this particular market.
This symposium begins with Professor Terrence Cain’s article enti-
tled: Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby 
and Change the Bathwater.3 Here, Professor Cain describes the specific 
context of litigation loans acquired by tort plaintiffs from third parties in 
anticipation of a recovery in a pending lawsuit. The dynamics of this set-
ting are typical of most fringe economy agreements: a necessitous or finan-
cially constrained borrower, a ready and willing lender, and interest rates 
that would astound a knowledgeable borrower, here a mere 280%, and that 
entangle the borrower with debt that is difficult to eliminate. Professor Cain 
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advocates maintaining the service provided by the industry but insists that 
the service must be subject to federal regulation. He concludes by propos-
ing a model act for Congress as well as states to consider.
Professor Michael H. Anderson, an economist, weighs in suggesting 
an historical symmetry between the ten-year period of the 1970’s and 80’s, 
with its three recessions between 1973 and 1981, and our current economic 
crisis in his essay on the subprime lending industry entitled: An Economic 
Perspective on Subprime Lending.4 He evaluates the common subprime 
mechanisms—rent-to-own, pay day lending, pawn shops, and title pawn 
lending. He concludes that rates between 200% and 1000% APR are a real-
ity for borrowers who contract in these markets despite the original short-
term goal and low principal amount of the loan. His analysis suggests that 
payday and pawn loans are the most egregious and calls for regulation of 
the subprime lending industry.
Professor Amy Schmitz, in Females on the Fringe: Considering Gen-
der in Payday Lending Policy,5 assesses the prevailing data on payday 
loans and concludes, as does Professor Anderson in his assessment of the 
rent-to-own industry,6 that the ills of payday lending disproportionately 
impact women and their families. Professor Schmitz joins other symposium 
authors in calling for regulation but goes beyond that call by suggesting 
creative, realistic options, both community based and Federal, to address 
the adverse impact of payday lending and to fill the void likely to be creat-
ed by effective regulation of the payday lending industry.7 Two thoughtful 
essays follow Professor Schmitz’ offering potential solutions to the debt 
crisis of fringe economy lending.
Timothy E. Goldsmith and Nathalie Martin share the results of their 
empirical research on the public perception of and the need for interest rate 
caps in their essay: Interest Rate Caps, State Legislation, and Public Opin-
ion: Does the Law Reflect the Public’s Desires?8 Goldsmith and Martin 
add the results of their study of New Mexico consumers that 86% of partic-
ipants thought that the rate caps should be imposed on short-term loans 
with over 72% selecting 25% or less as the cap to the staggering statistics 
from several states suggesting that the general public prefers reasonable 
4. Anderson, supra note 1.
5. Amy Schmitz, Females on the Fringe: Considering Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 89 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 65 (2013).
6. Anderson, supra note 2.
7. See generally, Anderson, supra note 1; Cain, supra note 3; Schmitz, supra note 5.
8. Timothy Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Interest Rate Caps, State Legislation, and Public 
Opinion: Does the Law Reflect the Public’s Desires?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115 (2013).
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caps on short-term loans like payday loans.9 This accumulated data sug-
gests that an accurate understanding of public perception should motivate 
the various legislative bodies across the nation in states that do not current-
ly cap store-front or short-term loans to change existing law.
Professor Anderson’s second essay, An Economic Investigation of 
Rent-to-Own Agreements,10 offers the rent-to-own paradigm and its de-
mographics as a better approach to short term leading. The symposium 
concludes the assessment of fringe economy lending as aberrant contract-
ing with a lender perspective article that addresses the wisdom of securitiz-
ing the receivables from fringe lending. Professor Thomas E. Plank in his 
article, Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables,11 identifies the 
goals and requirements for securitizing receivables and the issues that must 
be addressed when considering the securitization of fringe banking receiv-
ables. Professor Plank concludes by discussing the risks inherent in fringe 
banking receivables and the concerns that must be weighed to determine if 
the benefits of securitization can be realized.
The next set of articles by Professors Woodward and Bowers address 
other concerns with aberrant agreements, whether the term “aberrant” re-
fers to fringe economy lending or mass marketed adhesion contracts: 
choice of law and payment application. Professor Emeritus William 
Woodward addresses the legal uncertainty inherent in the union of choice 
of law provisions and arbitration of consumer claims in his essay, Legal 
Uncertainty and Aberrant Contracts: The Choice of Law Clause.12 He 
offers legislation—non-waivable consumer protection statutes—as the sole 
remedy “to resolve the extraordinarily complex legal problem that con-
fronts a consumer when the vendor replaces local consumer protection with 
that of another place through a contractual choice of law provision.”13 Pro-
fessor Woodward uses California’s non- waivable two-way fee-shifting 
statute as an example to illustrate his position.
Professor Bowers in his article, Some Economic Insights Into Applica-
tion of Payments Doctrine: Walker-Thomas Revisited.14 posits that the 
striking of the cross-collateral provision in the infamous Walker-Thomas
9. Id. at 120-29.
10. Anderson, supra note 2.
11. Thomas E. Plank, Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
171 (2013).
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contract because it was unconscionable “relegates the plaintiff to the de-
fault provisions of the common law, which may be even more unfavorable 
to the consumer than the stricken clause.”15 Revised UCC Article 9 creates 
an opportunity to address anew default application rules. Professor Bowers 
argues persuasively that consumers have several reasons for preferring, in a 
series of transactions with a given creditor—a fact pattern that often occurs 
in the rent-to-own context, to have their property interests protected in the 
last-purchased-collateral rather than the first.
Finally, the symposium concludes with other examples of contracts 
deemed by leading contract and commercial law scholars as “aberrant.” 
Professor Nancy Kim convincingly demonstrates that electronic contracts 
and electronic modifications of contracts are inherently aberrant in her 
article Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic Contracts16 and 
proposes an extension of the doctrine of duress as a defense in the electron-
ic contracting context. Professor J. Lyn Entrikin tackles the monumental 
task of advocating for change in the multifarious world of property taxes in 
her extensive study entitled: Tax Ferrets, Tax Consultants, Bounty Hunters, 
and Hired Guns: The Property Tax Netherworld Fueled by Contingency 
Fees and Champertous Agreements.17 Professor James J. White defines an 
aberrant contract as an asymmetric one that begins with terms proposed to 
consumers by powerful corporation on a “take it or leave it” basis. He con-
siders an aberration of this model, the tenure contract, “executed between a 
strong employer and a weak employee. But here the rule is reversed; the 
employee, presumptively the weaker party, gets his terms.”18 In his essay, 
Tenure, The Aberrant Consumer Contract, Professor White considers three 
issues: the origin of tenure, the terms of tenure, and its continued viability. 
He concludes by advocating abolition of tenure because tenure “injures our 
students, blocks the way to eager and highly competent professors, and 
generally degrades the efficiency of our schools.”19 The final submission in 
this symposium is Professor Scott Burnham’s assessment of exculpatory 
contracts as aberrant contracts. In his essay, Are You Free To Contract 
15. Id. at 231.
16. Nancy Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 265 (2013).
17. J. Lyn Entrikin, Tax Ferrets, Tax Consultants, Bounty Hunters, and Hired Guns: The Proper-
ty Tax Netherworld Fueled by Contingency Fees and Champertous Agreements, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
289 (2013).
18. James J. White, Tenure, The Aberrant Consumer Contract, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 353, 353
(2013).
19. Id. at 378.
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Away Your Right To Bring A Negligence Claim?,20 he evaluates the three 
prevailing approaches to the enforceability of exculpatory clauses and pro-
poses an analytical framework for courts to use when evaluating the en-
forceability of these clauses.
These thoughtful articles and essays are only part of the conversation 
in identifying solutions to the aberrancy of fringe economy lending and 
other agreements that deviate substantially from the arm’s length, bar-
gained-for exchange paradigm that is taught and upon which prevailing 
doctrines used to police contracts are based. As the dialogue continues 
either in response to the ideas and theories presented herein or as additions 
to them, the engagement should serve as an impetus for change.
20. Scott Burnham, Are You Free To Contract Away Your Right To Bring A Negligence Claim?,
89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379 (2013).

